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Abstract – It is a mainstream idea that scale-free network would be fragile under the selective
attacks. Internet is a typical scale-free network in the real world, but it never collapses under
the selective attacks of computer viruses and hackers. This phenomenon is different from the
deduction of the idea above because this idea assumes the same cost to delete an arbitrary node.
Hence this paper discusses the behaviors of the scale-free network under the selective node attack
with different cost. Through the experiments on five complex networks, we show that the scale-
free network is possibly robust under the selective node attacks; furthermore, the more compact
the network is, and the larger the average degree is, then the more robust the network is; With
the same average degrees, the more compact the network is, the more robust the network is. This
result would enrich the theory of the invulnerability of the network, and can be used to build the
robust social, technological and biological networks, and also has the potential to find the target
of drugs.
The invulnerability of complex network is an impor-
tant issue for various of real-world networks [1–3], such as
the social relationship network [4], Internet [5], the World
Wide Web [6], and the neural networks [7] and so on. The
knowledge on this topic may lead to build more robust
social, biological and technological networks, to find the
targets of drugs or to destroy the terrorist groups etc..
Moreover, the knowledge may lead to deeper understand-
ings of the stability of complex systems.
The pioneer scientists Rek´a Albert, Hawoong Jeong and
Albert-La´szlo´ Baraba´si proposed that the complex net-
works with scale-free property would be robust with ran-
dom errors, but fragile under the selective attacks, that is,
the robustness and the fragility coexist [1]. This conclu-
sion can be explained as follows, since the scale-free net-
works have a mass of nodes with less connectivity and a
small quantity of nodes with huge connectivity, the nodes
with less connectivity would be chosen with a high prob-
ability when the nodes are randomly chosen to remove,
such that the network would lose less edges and show large
invulnerability; on the other hand, if the nodes are pref-
erentially chosen, the nodes with large connectivity would
be firstly removed, such that the network would be very
fragile to collapse.
The following researches proved the idea of Albert et
al., for examples, the studies on the protein network [8],
on WWW [9],on the food chain network [10], on the Email
network [11], on Internet [12] and so on. These researchers
made the idea as a common knowledge of the scientists in
this field. Holme et al. [2] summarized that the selective
attacks can be categorized as node attacks and edge at-
tacks, and for each class, there are four strategies, that is,
ID(Initial-Degree), RD(Recalculated-Degree), IB(Initial-
Betweenness), RB(Recalculated-Betweenness), meaning
that based on the initial graphs or current graphs, or-
der the degree or the betweenness of the nodes/edges de-
scendingly, and chose the best node one by one to remove.
Holme et al. pointed out that scale-free networks are frag-
ile under all the attack strategies.
However, some scale-free networks provide exceptional
excuses. For example, Internet is regarded as a typi-
cal scale-free network, but it has surprising stability and
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rarely collapses. There are at least two reasons to support
its strong robustness: first, this network survives under the
selective attacks of the hackers. No hacker has achieved
the boastful victory although they have tried some very
important nodes; second, if one treats the attacks of the
hackers as random attack, although we do not agree on
this treatment, the spread of computer viruses would pro-
vide strong persuasion. For the nodes with large degree,
they will be infected with large probability because of
their numerous neighborhoods. From the view of statis-
tics, this is exactly the selective attacks. Another example
is the military networks. Due to the hierarchy of military
groups, the scale-free networks can be constructed [13,14].
According to Albert et al.’s idea, the military networks
would be very fragile and the strategy “to catch bandits
first catch the ringleader” would be the best. But, if this
idea holds, according to the evolutionary theory, the mili-
tary groups would evolve into other forms to confront the
selective/military attacks; on the other hand, the strate-
gics would not be so colorful since only one strategy is
enough.
Albert et al.’s idea assumed that the probability to re-
move any node or edge would be the same, or say, the
cost is the same. Surprisingly, few works explored the
world out of this hypothesis. Actually, no matter in In-
ternet, or in military groups, the cost to remove a node
would be certainly different. Moreover, the works mainly
employ the degree attacks and the betweenness attacks.
Considering that “the important nodes should be impor-
tant to the whole network”, the attack strategies would be
based upon the definition of “the importance of nodes”.
Therefore, the closeness [15] or the other definition such
as the definition in PageRank [16, 17] and HITS [18] also
can be used as an attack factor.
Thus, when the removal cost is different for the nodes
with different importance, what will happen? We can im-
age that a mass of man power and materials will be used
to enhance the protection of the important nodes such
that the important nodes could resist the attacks, thereby
lead to the increase of the robustness of the whole net-
work. Therefore, when considering the cost, the scale-free
network may be robust. In this Letter, we try to explore
the invulnerability of complex network with the consider-
ation of the different costs to delete the nodes and find
that some complex networks could be very robust under
the selective attacks.
For the quantitative validation of the robustness of
scale-free network under selective node attacks with the
consideration of the cost, we define the removal cost (at-
tack cost), the attack strategies, the attack effect based
on the previous related works, and we find that the com-
pactness and the average degree of scale-free network are
related to the robustness, furthermore, the more compact
the scale-free network is, and the larger the average degree
is, then the more robust the network is; for the same av-
erage degree, the more compact the scale-free network is,
the more robust the network is. Five scale-free networks
are used to validate our idea.
Here we firstly define the relevant concepts. Since we
only consider the selective node attacks, we define the at-
tack as the removal of a set of nodes. Since the degree
measure is the most natural measure to the property of
nodes, we use a function of the degree of the set of nodes
as the measure of the cost of an attack. That is, for given
graph G =< V,Edge > and the node set for the removal
of nodes Z,
Cost(Z) =
∑
v∈Z
f(Degree(v)) (1)
Here, f(x) can be defined as various functions, for exam-
ple, f(x) = x2. Under this circumstance, since the attack
cost of the nodes with higher degree would be remarkably
large, the best strategy would be to remove the nodes with
smaller degrees firstly. If f(x) = 1/x, since the attack cost
of important nodes would be smaller, it would be efficient
to remove the nodes with large degree. If f(x) = x0, that
is, f(x) = 1, the results would be the same as Baraba´si’s.
The fairest formation would be f(x) = x, here the cost is
equivalent to the degree, it also is the simplest formation.
This Letter suggests this function.
For any given network, there exists an upper limitation
when all the edges are removed. We normalize the cost
and have(denoted the normalized cost as C(Z)),
C(Z) =
Cost(Z)
Cost(V )
(2)
As to the attack strategies, due to the fact that the im-
portant nodes would be important to the whole network,
we can design the attack strategies according to the defini-
tions of the node importance. Considering the definitions
in Social Network [15], we focus on three strategies, IB
(Initial-Betweenness), ID (Initial-Degree) and IC (Initial-
Closeness). Focusing on the selective node attacks, the
important nodes would be preferentially removed.
As to the attack effects, the researchers have proposed
various measures. Commonly, it can be measured by the
difference of the performance of the tested network before
or after the attack, such as average geodesic length, aver-
age inverse geodesic length and the size of giant component
[2]. We use the size of giant component after the attack
S˜(Z) as the measure indicator, and considering universal
and convenient comparisons, we use the normalized size
E(Z), where,
E(Z) =
S˜(Z)
‖V ‖
(3)
Considering that there exist many kinds of attack
strategies, a network is said to be robust unless it can
resist multiple kinds of attack strategies. If considering
for the degree and the closeness only, assume that the de-
gree and the closeness is negatively correlated, then, the
important nodes (with larger closeness) can be removed
with smaller cost (equivalent to the degrees), such that
p-2
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Table 1: The statistic values of the selected networks. N is the
number of nodes, V x is the number of vertices, D is the aver-
age degree, δb is the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between
the degree and the betweenness, δc is the Pearson’s correlation
coefficient between the degree and the closeness.
Network N V x D δb δc
CSF-Compact 1000 5545 11.09 0.94 0.58
Polbooks 105 441 8.40 0.70 0.58
CSF-NonCompact 992 5948 12.0 0.45 0.62
Protein 1458 1948 2.67 0.85 0.42
Science 379 914 4.82 0.69 0.35
the network is fragile. Therefore, the compactness of the
network, or, every node importance measure would be pos-
itively related to the degree, is the necessary condition for
the robustness of the network.
Furthermore, considering that the networks with larger
average degree would have high probability to prevent
from the collapse, that is, they may not collapse after the
removal of one or multiple most important nodes, we will
investigate the relationship between the robustness and
the average degree.
We use five networks to explore their behaviors under
the selective node attacks, whose topographies are drawn
in Fig.1. Two of them are generated by CSF algorithm
[2], one is compact and shown as Fig.1(a), the other is
non-compact and shown as Fig.1(b). Three widely-used
real-world networks, the protein network [9] shown as
Fig.1(c) , the political books network (Polbooks1) shown
as Fig.1(d) and the scientific collaboration network [19]
shown as Fig.1(e), are chosen.
Since this Letter only focuses on the scale-free network,
we need to validate the scale-free property of the selected
networks. The common method is to check the networks
if their degree distribution will satisfy P (k) ∼ k−γ , here
γ is a constant and k is a random variant on the degree,
when plotting the equation in the log-log coordination,
the curve looks a straight line. We plot their degree dis-
tributions in Fig. 2. From this figure, we can see that
the curves approximate the straight line in the log-log co-
ordination. Considering that this method is qualitative,
we also check their scale-free property by the programme
written by Clauset et al. [20].
To measure the correlated coefficients between the de-
gree and the betweenness or the closeness, we use the Pear-
son’s correlation coefficient, which belongs to [−1, 1] and
−1 indicates the minimal negative correlation, and 1 in-
dicates the maximal positive correlation. The coefficients
and some statistic values of the selected networks are listed
in Tab. 1.
We choose IB, ID, IC as the attack strategies to carry
out the experiments. For any given attack, that is, the set
Z of nodes to be removed, we plot the corresponding nor-
1This network was edited by Valdis Krebs and can be downloaded
from MEJ Newman’s website.
malized cost C(Z) and the corresponding normalized at-
tack effect E(Z) under these strategies as Fig. 3. To avoid
the distortion of the curves, the normalized size of the set
Z is used. Just the same as the previous works, E(Z)
drops down drastically for all these networks, meaning
that the networks are very fragile. But we can also notice
that C(Z) increases drastically simultaneously. Therefore,
when the cost is taken into consideration, we can not con-
clude that the networks are fragile.
Since we can not determine the robustness only by C(Z)
or E(Z) respectively, we plot the corresponding relation-
ship between C(Z) and E(Z) in Fig. 4 for any given attack
Z. To explore the relative robustness, we use the complete
networks as the baseline. Any selective node attack would
not make this kind of networks collapse unless all the nodes
are removed. Therefore, the complete networks could be
regarded as the most robust without the consideration of
the cost. But in the viewpoint of the cost, they may waste
much resource on trivial nodes.
To explore the relationship between the robustness and
the compactness or the average degree, we categorize the
networks into two groups, which the first group has larger
average degree(that is, CSF-Compact, CSF-NonCompact
and Polbooks) and the second with smaller average de-
gree( i.e., Protein and Science).
As to the first group, Fig. 4 shows that all three net-
works have good resistance to ID attacks in contrast to
the complete networks, because a majority of points are
located above the baseline, meaning that ID attacks on
these networks would pay larger percentage of cost but
achieve less effects. From the subfigure 4(a), we can see
that every curve of the CSF-Compact network does not
differ much from the others and the majority parts of them
locates above the baseline, meaning that this network can
resist all three attack strategies, but for the subfigures 4(b)
and 4(c), the curves differ much, especially for 4(b), most
points of IB curve locate below the baseline, meaning that
the CSF-NonCompact network and the Polbooks network
can not perform well for IB attacks, this phenomenon must
be attributed to their smaller δb such that the important
nodes can be removed with small cost. As to the second
group, Fig. 4 shows that both networks do not perform
well to all the attacks in contrast to the complete networks,
since the curves are totally below the baseline. But ow-
ing to the compactness, the Protein network still performs
better than the Science network.
Two check points are chosen to quantitatively demon-
strate the attack effects on these networks. The first check
point is E(Z)=80%. Tab. 2 lists the attack cost under ID,
IB and IC for five networks.
Tab. 2 shows that 20% size of giant component of the
CSF-Compact network would need to pay 71.25% cost un-
der the ID strategy, moreover, the gap between ID and IB
is very small, the gap between ID and IC is also small.
But for the CSF-NonCompact network, the gap between
IB and ID achieves 44.26%; as to the Polbooks network,
the gap also achieves 14.74%, meaning that both networks
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(a) CSF-Compact (b) CSF-NonCompact (c) Polbooks (d) Protein (e) Science
Fig. 1: The Topographies of the Selected Networks
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Fig. 2: The Cumulative Degree Distributions of the Selected Networks. The X-axes are random variants on degree, and the
Y-axes are the cumulative probability of random variants.
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Fig. 3: The Attack Experiments on the Selected Networks. The X-axes are the normalized size of the set responding to the
attacks and the Y-axes are the responding attack cost C(Z) and attack effect E(Z). In every subfigures, better attack effect
responds more cost.
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Fig. 4: The Attack Effects with the Consideration of the Cost on the Selected Networks. Every point in the curves represents
an attack. The X-axes are the responding attack cost C(Z), the Y-axes are the responding attack effect E(Z) for the same
attacks. The baseline is the attack cost and the attack effect to the complete network. The points above the baseline mean
better attacks which obtain better attack effect but with less cost percentage.
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Table 2: C(Z) when E(Z)=80%
Network ID IB IC
CSF-Compact 71.25% 70.77% 66.79%
Polbook 63.04% 48.30% 45.35%
CSF-NonCompact 68.78% 24.52% 53.53%
Protein 19.85% 19.77% 24.63%
Science 18.22% 5.51% 7.68%
have community structures and can not resist all attack
strategies. As to the Protein network and the Science net-
work, because less average edges leads to fast collapses,
less cost can achieve better attack effects.
The second check point is chosen at E(Z)=30%. Tab. 3
lists C(Z) under ID, IB and IC strategies.
Tab. 3 shows that the CSF-Compact network still is
very robust, achieving 30% size of giant component would
spend over 90% cost for all three strategies. As to the
other networks, less cost means that great collapse has
emerged.
The experimental results support the proposed ideas.
We can further rationalize the ideas in a simple way. Here
we assume that the size of giant component is still used to
evaluate the attack effects and the cost is considered.
The process is demonstrated with a simple language as
follows,
Proposition 1: The RD strategy is the worst attack
strategy when the target networks do not collapse.
Proof: Assume that Z|RD is a set to represent an
RD attack, and E(Z|RD) = ‖N‖ − ‖Z|RD‖, that is, the
network does not collapse. For any given Z ′ and ‖Z ′‖ =
‖Z|RD‖, because E(Z
′) ≤ ‖N‖ − ‖Z ′‖ = E(Z|RD), and
C(Z ′) ≤ C(Z|RD). i.e., the RD attack pays more cost
but obtains worst effects. So the RD strategy is the worst
attack strategy.
According to proposition 1, if we can construct a net-
work that does not collapse under the RD strategy, then
this network would be very robust under RD selective at-
tack.
Proposition 2: Any connected network (‖N‖ ≤ 3)
would have at least a collapse under all RD attacks except
the complete networks.
Proof: Considering the connected network with
‖N‖ = 3, when it is not complete, it would collapse under
the RD attack. Since the connected network with ‖N‖ = 3
is the most foundational case, it is easy to conclude that
only the complete networks would never collapse under
the RD attacks.
The complete networks would never collapse, but most
networks is not complete. In the real world, it would
be a massive resource waste to construct such complete
networks. That is, the collapses are essential. A robust
network for selective attack is not a network which never
collapse, but a network resists the attacks with higher effi-
ciency before the collapses and has endurance to collapse.
A selective attack strategy actually defines a sequence
Table 3: C(Z) When E(Z)=30%
Network ID IB IC
CSF-Compact 92.15% 91.68% 92.84%
Polbook 78.41% 72.91% 75.58%
CSF-NonCompact 89.31% 35.54% 56.31%
Protein 54.38% 50.33% 54.30%
Science 29.24% 21.39% 20.19%
of attacks for a specific network. Each element in the
sequence is a set, i.e., an attack.
Proposition 3: For a specific network, for any given
measure if the attack strategy based upon this measure
can generate an attack sequence which is the same as the
sequence of RD, then this attack strategy is the worst
before the collapse.
This proposition is obvious, it means that if a network
is robust under the selective attacks, then this network
would be: 1) the attack strategies based upon the impor-
tance measures are the same as RD. 2) The networks can
resist more time, that is,the collapses would emerge later.
As to the scale-free networks, since ID is very similar to
RD, we can use ID to approximate RD. Hence, proposition
3 can be rewritten as follows,
Proposition 3’: For a specific scale-free network, for
any given measure, if the attack strategy based upon this
measure can generate an attack sequence which is the same
as the sequence of ID, then this attack strategy is bad
before the collapse.
Some scale-free networks, such as the CSF-Compact
network, have the compactness property, that is, if one
node is important in a measure, often also important in
another measure.
Considering the endurance before the collapses for the
scale-free networks. If the exponent of degree distribu-
tion keeps constant, the relative important nodes, even
the trivial nodes would gain more edges when the aver-
age degree increases. This fact means that the ID attack
would be more difficult to divide the network.
According to the analysis above, it would be reasonable
that the compact scale-free networks with higher average
degree would resist the ID attack strategy, and simultane-
ously the other selective node attack strategies.
In general, this Letter advances the current ideas on
the fragility of the scale-free networks and proposes that
some scale-free networks could be robust under the selec-
tive node attacks when the networks are compact with a
high average degree considering the cost of attacks. The
experimental results on five networks validate this idea.
However, this Letter spawns more problems. First,
what kinds of networks would be the most robust net-
works under a cost constraint? This problem is related to
build robust social, biological and technological networks,
or to destroy these networks, and probably be useful to
understand the evolutionary principles of these networks.
Second, what will happen when considering the vertices
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attacks? Third, whether there exists a phase transition
for the average degree vs. the robustness of the networks?
Fourth, which attack strategies would be the most efficient
strategies for a specific network? etc. These problems will
be investigated in the future works.
Besides, the conclusions in this Letter could be potential
to explain the evolutionary principles of biological popu-
lations and social systems which obey the power law dis-
tributions. In these networks, the evolution of nodes can
be owed to the new nodes which could be helpful of the
stability of the whole networks, that is, the nodes would
obey the law that “the most stable nodes survive”, here
the stability is the adaption. In the BA model, the nodes
would obey the law that “the strongest nodes survive”,
here the power is the adaption. By comparing to these
two models, we can conclude that the previous one pro-
vides one holistic viewpoint, and the BA model is based
upon the individual viewpoint.
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